Abstract -Malware distribution using drive-by download attacks has become the most prominent threat for organizations and individuals. Compromised web services and web applications hosted on the cloud act as the delivery medium for the exploits.
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of defense in depth strategy for securing large networks and individual machines at network level had shifted focus of the attack vectors on to the port 80. In the exploit code shown in Fig. 1 , adversaries point the remote file location to a malicious executable and the local path for storage is set to the startup folder with the help of "CompressedPath" method, to ensure its execution. The "PrintSnapshot" method is called for performing the drive-by attack.
As the legitimate web applications and services are compromised, the trust of the user on the legitimate websites is exploited and the traffic is redirected towards malicious websites. Therefore implementing the security controls within the browsers to ensure end point security has become necessary. For protecting the clients from such attacks, a machine learning technique for the detection of the malicious code exploiting the plugin vulnerabilities was proposed and evaluated in this paper.
II. RELA TED WORK
The drive-by downloads targeting the vulnerabilities in the web clients are on the rise. The security issues have prompted researchers to come up with novel solutions for 547 countering the attacks. Several works have been proposed in this direction using different types of approaches. Similar to the traditional honeypots which were used to collect exploits and malware, systems are proposed to crawl and visit webpages using specially built machines for detecting the client side attacks. These systems are referred as the honeyclients. High interaction honeyclients are heavy weight systems that visit webpages in a virtual machine and detects the attacks based on the system state changes and other events [2] [3] [4] . The high interaction honeyclients take large amount of time and hardware resources and are not scalable to the current size of the Internet. The attacks are detected in these systems only if a download happens.
As an alternative, the researchers have proposed low interaction honeyclients that would rely on emulation based techniques for detecting the attacks. The low interaction honeyclients are much faster than the high interaction honeyclients and are scalable. PhoneyC [5] uses emulated environment to visit web pages and compares the code identified with the predefined attack signature patterns for the detection of the attacks. Wepawet [6] uses an emulated environment for the execution of the code in the webpages and uses anomaly based model for the detection of the malicious code based on the predefined set of features. These approaches are prone to be evaded by the modem attacks which include fmgerprinting code to detect emulated and virtual environments. This limitation has made researchers come up with techniques for handling the evasion techniques in such detection approaches [7] [8]. However, the proposed approach could be integrated into the web browsers and would not be prone to such evasion techniques.
Web Winnow [9] uses the defense and attack mechanisms employed in the exploit kits for the detection of the drive-by attacks. Features related to the behavior, redirections, obfuscation and cloaking are used for the analysis. Different machine learning models were evaluated using the webpages from the exploit kits and the webpages from the wild.
Detection of shellcodes in the drive-by download attacks using the kernel machines with the help of opcodes frequencies was proposed [10] . As the presence of shellcodes in webpages is malicious, it is effective in detecting only the attacks that use shellcodes for performing the drive-by downloads.
Zozzle [11] is a lightweight solution based on static analysis for the detection of JavaScript mal ware. Zozzle is designed for integration into the browser and relies on the construction of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) through static parsing of the JavaScript code and uses NaIve Bayesian classifier to detect the attacks. BrowserGuard [12] proposes a behavior based approach for detecting the drive-by download attacks. The fundamental idea behind this approach is to identify the files that are downloaded without the consent of the user and prevent such files from execution.
Nozzle [13] proposed a mechanism for the detection of heap spraying attacks based on the analysis of the objects allocated in the heap and measuring the health metrics of the allocated heap. Nozzle checks each object allocated in the browser's heap for detecting the malicious intent.
In [14] , the authors have proposed the detection of ActiveX exploits based on the inter-module communications.
The communications between the browser and the plugins are monitored. A vulnerability signature database was constructed from the known set of attacks and symbolic constraint signatures are used for detection. In order to track the attacks involving multiple steps, the session is tracked for each plugin. In this paper, we propose to identify the misuse of the functionalities provided by the plugins by building a learning model using the proposed set of features. The proposed approach has been integrated into the browser and the overhead in the performance was also studied.
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III. SYSTEM
The system uses the proposed feature set that is extracted from the benign and malicious use cases of different plugins to generate a model using the Support Vector Machines. The generated model would have the capability to judge between the malicious and benign use cases. The features proposed are both specific to the plugins and generic, enabling the approach to be extensible to the newer or unseen plugins. The challenging job in handling the attacks is to overcome the obfuscations performed using client-side interpreters like JavaScript. To overcome the limitations of the obfuscations, the system is designed to read the communications between the plugins and the browser.
A. Plugin Calls Tracker
The malicious code often uses client-side scnptmg languages to obfuscate the code and hide the malicious intent. The results observed in the evaluation are presented in Table I . The cost for misclassification for malicious instance was set to be four times the cost of misclassification of a benign instance. This was done to compensate the imbalanced distribution of benign and malicious use cases in the dataset.
The accuracies observed are listed in Table I under "Weighted
Costs" column. As high false negative rates were observed on using the weighted costs, the classification accuracy was evaluated on balanced data using synthetically generated data from the existing data points. Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling
Technique (SMOTE) [22] algorithm was used for t�e generation of synthetic data for the malicious use cases. In thIS oversampling technique new data points are created rather than duplicating the existing data points. Each sample from the minority class is considered and a sample is generated along the line joining the k minority class nearest neighbors.
The number of nearest neighbors (k) was set to be five, the default value. Based on the amount of over-sampling Synthetic data of 30,717 malicious samples were created using the SMOTE technique and the detection accuracy was computed by using 50% of the samples for training and 50%
of the samples for testing. The accuracies observed are listed in Table I under "Over Sampling" column.
False positive rates and the false negative rates are calculated using the following equations. 
F. Performance Evaluation
The performance overhead introduced by implementing the proposed mechanism is computed by visiting the top 1500 webpages of Alexa [17] . The implementation is done in an emulated browser, HTMLUnit [18] . The HTMLUnit has been modified to emulate the presence of the plugins and the corresponding methods. For performing the experiment, the clean HTMLUnit and the custom built HTMLUnit with the proposed implementation were used. Webpage by Alexa Rank 
WEBPAGES
The performance overhead is evaluated by comparing the load times of the webpages. An average performance overhead of 5.14% was introduced by the proposed approach with a standard deviation of 5.57%. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the observed overheads for the top 1500 and top 20 web pages by traffic. Webpage by Alexa Rank 
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The model built using the Support Vector Machines learns from both the benign and malicious use cases and selects support vectors maximizing the area of separation. This offers advantages in detection and scalability compared to the signature based detection approaches. The overhead incurred due to the proposed approach was computed and was observed to be 5.14%.
